Where the Space Force’s new ‘theory of success’ succeeds

Final week, the chief of area operations publicly launched a white paper he has been speaking about for the previous yr. Gen. Likelihood Saltzman’s paper comes with a daring title, “Aggressive Endurance: A Proposed Principle of Success for the House Pressure.” At just below six pages, it’s effectively well worth the learn, even for these in a roundabout way within the internal workings of the army’s latest service. 

Within the paper, Gen. Saltzman lays out a concept for a way the House Pressure can perform its core mission—to guard U.S. pursuits in, from, and to area—whereas balancing the stress between utilizing area for army benefit whereas additionally being a accountable steward of the area. This white paper will get many issues proper, goes a bit off beam in a number of locations, and, most significantly, tells us loads about how the House Pressure sees itself.

Beginning with what the paper will get proper—and there may be a lot to commend—it lays out a coherent definition of area superiority: the flexibility to “make use of area capabilities in assist of army targets whereas additionally stopping adversaries from utilizing their very own.” 

It accurately observes that on the finish of the Chilly Battle, the U.S. army started to neglect the second a part of this definition, stopping an adversary from utilizing area in opposition to us. Within the Nineties and 2000s, the Air Pressure’s myopic concentrate on area as merely an enabler for different forces induced it to lose sight of the rising competitors in area and to overlook how contested it had been all through the Chilly Battle.

The place the paper actually hits its stride is in its description of the aggressive dilemma the US faces in area. It observes that in different domains the idea of management is achieved “by the risk or utility of overwhelming harmful army power.” In different phrases, if you wish to set up management within the air, sea, or land domains, it’s a must to blow stuff up—or no less than credibly threaten to blow stuff up. This doesn’t work effectively in area as a result of blowing stuff up (or threatening to take action) could be ineffective and even counterproductive in lots of conditions. Not all adversaries have area capabilities to focus on, and for those who do, destroying their satellites doesn’t convey management. In truth, the area particles produced by kinetic assaults in area would really make it more durable for us to make use of our personal area capabilities. That is the central dilemma in area superiority: how do you deny an adversary the usage of area whereas additionally sustaining your individual capacity to make use of area?

The speculation of success proposed—what it calls Aggressive Endurance—has three elements: 1) keep away from operational shock, 2) deny first-mover benefit, and three) confront malign exercise. 

The paper doesn’t try and operationalize this concept, which might require excess of six pages, however it does present some path. Avoiding operational shock requires a excessive diploma of area area consciousness to detect and characterize adjustments within the working surroundings and the capabilities employed by others. Denying first-mover benefit means constructing extra resilient and guarded area capabilities that degrade gracefully (fairly than catastrophically) when attacked. In different phrases, cease constructing juicy targets in area. 

Confronting malign exercise in area is maybe an important element of the idea. Because the paper notes, “Russia and China are trying to erode our benefits in area by way of oblique actions under the brink of armed battle.” I might go additional and add that they’re making an attempt to situation us to just accept a sure stage of counterspace exercise as regular. Our failure to confront this “grey zone” aggression in area solely invitations extra aggression. The paper argues that leaving these malign actions unchecked might hamper our capacity to attain area superiority when an overt battle unfolds. Confronting this habits requires having and exercising the flexibility to make use of counterspace capabilities in a accountable method, even throughout day-to-day competitors.

Whereas there may be a lot to commend on this white paper, the language and selection of phrases typically misses the mark. The third element of the idea, which I describe above as confronting malign exercise in area, is definitely labeled within the doc as “accountable counterspace campaigning.” “Campaigning” was one of many buzzwords that emerged from the 2022 Nationwide Protection Technique, however it doesn’t do an enough job of speaking the essential level the paper is attempting to make. Because the Heart for a New American Safety’s Becca Wasser accurately notes, “the idea is at the moment ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation doesn’t assist the DoD meet its deterrence necessities or align technique and sources.” 

The paper’s phrase selections may also be higher the place it discusses the usage of “harmful” power in area: particularly, actions that may create area particles. It could be extra exact to label this as utilizing “kinetic power.” There are types of assault in area that may destroy a satellite tv for pc—that’s, render it utterly inoperable—with out producing particles, however kinetic assaults in area inherently run the chance of making particles. 

The paper additionally pulls a punch when it makes use of the phrase “counter-targeting techniques” to explain how we are going to disrupt adversary kill chains that run by way of area. There isn’t any must mince phrases; we’re speaking about attacking adversary area techniques so as to shield U.S. forces on the bottom. Whereas there should still be some sensitivities throughout the broader coverage group about explicitly saying this, the time to recover from these qualms has lengthy handed. Even the French speak overtly about utilizing counterspace capabilities.

Most significantly, the paper doesn’t talk about how business area capabilities play into the idea of success. It is a notable oversight, particularly given how briskly business area corporations are advancing among the key capabilities this concept requires. For instance, business area area consciousness, distant sensing, and operational expertise with extremely proliferated constellations can and may play an essential function in avoiding operational shock and denying first-mover benefit. The power to entry business area providers might be an essential layer of resilience, and it’s an uneven benefit the US and its allies get pleasure from relative to Russia and China, whose business area capabilities lag far behind.

Regardless of these criticisms, I give the white paper an general grade of A. It’s effectively thought out and speaks many truths—issues that have to be mentioned publicly and from the highest management of the House Pressure. Greater than something, the idea outlined within the paper provides us perception into the best way the service thinks about itself, its function throughout the Division of Protection, and its strategic path. It tells us that the House Pressure understands its objective—its raison d’être—and why it was elevated from an typically dismissed Air Pressure main command to a fully-fledged service. 

Whereas opponents of the House Pressure, similar to Dave Deptula, argue that having a well-developed concept of spacepower needs to be a precondition for creating an unbiased service, this white paper proves the alternative is true. The institution of the House Pressure created the situations underneath which theories like Basic Saltzman’s might lastly emerge—one thing that by no means occurred within the many many years area was underneath the Air Pressure. It exhibits that the House Pressure has carved out its piece of the general strategic issues dealing with the U.S. army, understands what makes these issues uniquely laborious in area, and has a plan to make actual progress addressing them. 

The paper additionally demonstrates an acceptable diploma of mental humility by explicitly stating that this concept “is a degree of departure for evaluation and critique.” This offers me renewed hope and optimism that the House Pressure is headed in the appropriate path, and this paper serves as a foundation by which we will all maintain the House Pressure accountable and contribute to its success within the years to come back.

Todd Harrison is a senior fellow on the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the place he focuses on protection technique and budgeting, the protection industrial base, and area coverage and safety.